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in the Republic of Viet Nam 
The scope of this study is three-fold. It attempts 
mainly to explore United States involvement in the Republic 
of Viet Nam from the perspectives of the history, the a ims 
and the effectiveness of the pacification program. 
The rationale for the use of such a method as pacifi-
cation in tne rural areas of Viet Nam may be traced back at 
least as far as the beginning of Western colonial interests 
there. Saigon submitted to colonial rule by France in 1885. 
French control came to an abrupt halt when the colony was 
surrendered without a struggle to Japan in 194.0 by the pro-
Nazi Admiral Decoux. After fifty-five years of French dom-
ination, the entire Indochinese area had 2% of its children 
in school. Not including work camps, there were eighty-one 
prisons. The territory of present-day Laos had only one 
native docto·r.. After 1940 French bureaucrats in Viet Nam 
worked for Japan. During the year 194.3 the bureaucracy 
spent 71,000 piastres for hospitals and 4}z million for opium 
distributed through the official opium monopoly.l South 
Viet Nam under French rule had had one doctor for every 
120,000 people. Even today there are only 1000 South Viet-
namese doctors for a total population of 15 million, and 700 
~re in the armed forces. "The other 300 have the right 
connections or have bought their way out. Of course, in 
private practice, they make up for it by chargitig outrageous 
£ees."2 This situation poses severe problems, especially 
with the nonurban population which makes up 80% of Viet 
Nam. 
As an infant nation, Viet Nam naturally has had a 
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a difficult struggle to survive the many political and 
economic traumas concomitant with devel9pment. Yet because 
of the ravages of long years of war and dislocation of the 
peasants, Viet Nam--more than other parts of the 11 third 
world", is "out of the habit" of attempting to be a produc-
tive society. The United States has been partially respon-
sible for this attitude through an overabundance of aid. 
Whenever there is a shortage, the American government imme-
diately sends in supplies. The people have been rapidly 
developing a "dole complex."3 This ever-present atmosphere 
is being combatted by the Self-Help portion of p acification. 
1961 was a key year for the beginning of direct United 
States participation in pacification. Pr•e sident Kennedy 
was attempting to make peace with Laos while trying to win 
the war in Viet Nam. Although Kennedy supported the Ngo 
regime, he was violently opposed to its anti-Buddhist bias. 
(Kennedy publicly denounced the anti-Buddhist policies of 
the Ngos before the United Nations in September, 1963.) 
There were three missions sent to Viet Nam in 1961: Vice 
President Johnson in April; Professor Eugene Staley of 
Stanford Research Institute from May to July; and, 
General Maxwell Taylor--the most prestigious military ad-
viser and Walt Rostow--the most respected civilian adviser--
in September. The Staley mission was by f'ar the most impor-
tant of' the three.4 
Although the Staley Report was of' an essentially civi-
lian nature, very f'ew nonmilitary recommendations were made. 
None of Staley.ts proposals considered the political changes 
most observers believed were necessary.? Staley devised a 
stra,tegy that was meant to be applied for two years. But. 
more than this, the plan defined an entire war policy. 
Staley stayed in Saigon for six weeks, was aided by the Viet-
namese economist--Vu Quoc Thuc(a law prof'essor in Saigon) and 
was directed by Ngo Dinh Nhu(Diem1s brother and political 
adviser.)6 
The original pacif'ication idea was to establish stra-
tegic hamlets only in areas "that had already been more or 
less recaptured." The placing of a hamlet in Viet Gong-
held territory would be too risky. If' it fell, the confi-
dence of the people might be lost. In order to secure max-
imum government control of' the countryside, most Vietnamese 
military of'ficials wanted to fit the rural hamlet system into 
the social structure of the peasantry.7 
Specific recommendations of the Staley Report included: 
enlargement of ARVN f'orces to 170,000 and an increase of its 
anti-guerrilla training; supplying the Dan-V~(Village Militia) 
with modern arms and radio equipment; doubling the Bao-An 
(Civil Guard) to 120,000 men; building strategic hamlets 
and villages and increasing the agrovilles from twenty-two 
to one hundred in a year's time.8 The chief military empha-
sis was on the village militia. All soldiers, however, were 
to receive some psychological training because certain sources 
within the United States(notably ~magazine) had stated 
that poor behavior on the part of government soldiers was 
largely responsible for bad feeling against the Saigon ad-
ministration. The agroville(khu ~mat) experiment, which 
had been attempted three years ago, was to be resumed. 
Strategic hamlets were to be set up to surround the agrovilles 
so th~t peasants could retreat to the hamlets after having 
worked in the agro-cities during the day. In this way pro-
tection would be given to 800,000 persons out of a rural 
population of eight million(i.e., 10% of the farming pOpf' 
ulation.) A very important trui sm emerges here: "Staley's 
economic program was dependent upon the mobilization of 
considerable,military means.n9 
The ~ chien luoc (strategiq hamlet) program of rural 
develppment was formally launChed on Februrary 3, 1962 by 
presidential decree. A basic unit was thus provided through 
which Saigon mi ght control the countryside w.hile giving 
the peasantry a certain amount of self-determination. After 
Diem's fall ~chien ~continued as the New Life Hamlet 
Program. It is presently known in the United States as 
Revolutionary Development.lO 
Gargantuan amounts of internal corruption coupled with 
Viet Gong disruption of transportation, communication and 
commerce h ave caused United States of fici als to believe that 
somethi.ng more than the convent i onal AID program is needed 
in Viet Narn. In the year 196_5, ~·- 1_500 local government officials, 
school teachers, he alth workers and agricultural agents were 
either killed or kidnapped. One m.i. ght add that over two-
thirds of the able-bodied men from t wenty to thirty ye ars of' 
age are and have been involved in some ph ase of the war. 
Inflation and losses in the living standard caused by de-
creased domestic production are ever-pre sent dangers.ll 
The bulk of American non-military aid to Viet Nam for the 
past few ye ars, ther efore, h as worked "to h e lp fe ed t h e 
people, keep the civil economy functioning and fore s tall 
runaway inflation."l2 
The: current Revolutionary Development effort is explained 
by the United States Agency for International Development as 
"a process through which the Government of Vietnam is attemp-
ting to secure its countryside from Viet Gong terrorism and 
other forms of illegal activity and, at the same time, to 
bui ld a new and more promis i n g life for its rural peopl e." 
The AID h as outli ned three phases of pacification. First, 
there is a "clearing" phase in which mi litary forces are 
deployed to eliminate Viet Cong guerrilla bands from the 
area to be secured. Second, during "securing" military 
I 
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forces keep a shield around the area while security forces 
attempt to eliminate or cripple Viet Gong political control 
(the Viet Gong "infrastructure".) In this phase the Revolu-
tionary Development Cadre begin restoring local governmental 
structures which will relate to the administration in Saigon. 
Basic economic and social improvements are also included in 
in the sec1.:tri ty phase. The third step is called "develop-
ment•" It provides for more social and economic betterment, 
which will pave the way for development of the country when 
peace finally arrives. 
The AIDrole in New Life or Revolutionary Development 
places heavy emphasis on the efforts of the Vietnamese work-
ing together in local projects. In self-help programs, farmers 
and villagers supply the labor and in many cases funds while 
the governments of Viet Nam and of the United States give 
necessary funds and materials Which are too expensive for 
the local people. In order to further education in rural areas, 
hamlet schools, teachers and instructional materials are 
provided by the government. Rural public works projects 
construct communal roads and increase rural electrification. 
In an animal husbandry plan farmers are given livestock on 
a credit basis along with training on how to increase their 
holdings. Agricultural irrigation for improvement of crop 
production and a rural health program are being instituted. 
Finally, there are many other smaller projects which attem~ 
to augument rural income.l3 
As has been noted, there are many very positive aspects 
to Revolutionary Development as outlined by the AID. Yet 
one must submit the program to an acid test: how effective 
has it been? In 1963 an overextension of the hamlets almost 
completely obliterated ti~em. Peter Arnett of the Associated 
Press repor·t:;ed April 21, 1967 that the American government 
wants teams to work only where maximum security is in effect 
in order to avoid another such catastrophe. In the same news 
dispatch Arnett explained hoitl people around communist war · 
zones are being resettled. A "scorched earth" policy is 
destroying all living things in the evacuted areas in order 
to starve out the enemy. The people, however, tire of the 
squalor of the ~esettlement camps and want to see their 
family burial grounds again. They return to the forbidden 
areas and make themselves targets.l4 
Even the minister of Revolutionary Development, Major 
General Nguyen Due Thang, admitted publicly on November 11, 
1966 th~t. ~he pacificati on program had fallen short of its 
goals. T.heng's criticism centered on the New Life Hamlet 
Program(which he referred to as "old life" hamlets.) Tha 
new life hamlets were said not to have provided any sem-
·blance of a new life. Thang listed the l ack of any real 
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~social revolution, r esentment caused by forced labor and 
communists remaining in suppos edly secure are as as reasons 
for the dearth of progress. · He proposed the giving of 
$33.9 million to the program in 1967(a 40% increase) . and 
allowing the people to control the hamlets instead of the RD 
cadres.l5 
Late in 1966 an . American source on pacification was 
quoted as saying: "Whatever progress has been made has been 
ma de by knerican, South Kor e an or Australian security. The 
South Vietnamese themselves h ave scored enough failures to 
offset this. The re sult of this ambitious pro gram, so far, 
is that not a single Province in the entire country is 
absolute secure." The l argest problem seems to be with the 
South Vietnamese bureaucracy which the United States i s 
supporting. Many aid materials simply do not get from Saigon 
to the rural areas. "[GraftJ appears not so much the fault 
of the AID as the White House.• s own top-level decision to 
keep, in every Wqy, from interfering with the South Viet-
n amese government.nl6 If the program continues at its 
present rate, it will require 89 years to pacify the 2.500 
villages in South Viet Nam."l7 
Robert w. Komer, special assistant to the president and 
now civilian he ad of pacification, reported to President 
Johnson on September 13, 1966 that since the Honolulu con-
. ference of February 6 through 8, 1966, many concrete improvements 
have been made• To counter inflation the Vietnamese piastre 
was devaluated 50%(now worth 118 piastres to the dollar.) 
Electrical power has been given to 135 rural localities. 
Port congestion was reduced, and customs duties and domestic 
taxes were increased. The cost of living stopped rising 
by late summer, and . conf'i dence in the piastre grew stronger. 
(See Appendix II.) The mos.t important and immeasurable aspect 
of the rural pacification program.is that the people have 
learned, in some instances, to work together non projects 
which benefit a large group. This factor alone sets a prece-
dent for most of Southeast Asia.l8 
The eighth organizational change in the South Viet-
namese pacification program was annotmced May 12,1967. 
United States military forces took over the bulk of the 
work of pacification. Although the Agency for International 
Development and the Office of Civilian Operations will 
remain in South Viet Nam, they will no longer govern paci-
fication. All of the ultimate decisions now pass to the 
senior military man in each of South Viet Nam 1 s four corps 
areas. A conservative estimate states that the United States 
troop total will climb to at least 700,000 quite soon. One 
civilian source argued against the military takeover: "The 
merger is a little like taking all the welfare agencies in 
New York City and putting them under the police commissioner. 
We've got different backgrounds, different problems and 
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different ways of doing things." The prime r e ason given for 
the change was security. The 20 1 000 pa cification officials 
wo~k in 59-man teams. Because of lax military surveillance, 
220 have already been killed by the Viet Gong so far in 
1967."1~ 
We have seen that American motives in pacifica tion seem 
to be "good." With massive assist ance of men and dollars, 
the government of the United States feels that it can change 
ancient patterns of life Q~ thi nking--almost tt overni ght. u 
If p acificati on fails the war is not neces s arily lost, but 
there is certain to be more destruction. Arnett predicts 
that the entire com1try of Viet Nrun may have the same 
appearance a s the southern delta if i t "resists pacification" 
for the eighth time: .... ~ ••• the war has virtually overrun the 
whole population. Paddy fields are overgrow~, homes destroyed, 
dikes broken and the p6pulatian gone."20 The American govern-
ment must ultimately b e posed with s everal very cr ucial ques-
tions. Is the capitalistic s ystem the only workable solution 
to the problems of a developing nation? Is it possible to 
superimpose a Protestant socioeconomic structure on an Oriental 
culture? Finally, do i-Je as a nation have the right to play 
God in Southeast Asia? 
11. 
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Appendix I. Contradictions 
In doing research work on a problem as complicated as 
the current United States commitments in Viet Nam~ one 
encounters many contradictory statements. Considering the 
differing views on the Viet Nam conflict, this would only 
seem natural. One concrete discrepancy occurred between 
two conservative news media: Associated Press and the 
Saturday Evening Post. 
11Westmoreland ••• will h ave a civilian deputy heading up 
the United States pacification work. He is Robert w. Komer, 
44, special assistant to President Johnson, who is known to 
approve the milit ary takeover."---Arkansas Gazette, Friday, 
May 12, 19Q7 
" ••• the President's two chief civilian advisers on 
the conduct of the war--Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara 
and White House aide Robert Komer--both oppose giving 
American forces the pacification mission. 11 Saturday Evening 
Post, P• 26. 
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Appendix II. AID information 
on organization and success of pacification 
More specific information is given at the end o£ the 
Komer report on pacification successfulness(published as 
The Other War !a Yi£i ~--A Progress Report.) Komer 
details work in pacification during the seven-month period 
from the Honolulu conference of February, 1966 to the 
date of the report--September, 1966. 
A major goal of the Honolulu conference was the 
continued emphasis on rural construction work. In addition 
to successes given on page 9 of this paper, Komer cited: 
{1) The placing of eighty wells and 60 potable water systems 
in villages and district towns; 
(2) Improvement of mechanisms of providing credit to the 
farmer and to the small businessman; 
(3) The distribution of 26 1 000 pigs of improved varieties 
of Yorkshire and Berkshire; 
(4) A pilot program for distributing 14,000 acres in 
An Giang is proceeding(a step toward land reform). 
,.. ..... ~ ~"'- ...... ')' 
C,o.~\JE:._.S 
VIETNAM REVOLUTIONA RY DEVELOPMENT CADRE 
v ' 
TAB B 
The te rm 11 ~adre 11 , as used in t he Vie t nam Revoluti onary Devel opment 
( RD) program, r efers to villagers who have ' been t r ained and employed as non-
p~ rrna,n~nt Vi.ei.n~EL.Q:Qyer_p_D).§.!l~-~rs o!'!n§ll and qss j gned t o w,2,r.k in their -
~~r_§_gS whicl}_h_a.:~~-~-~-~!12~-g-~_ntly..cl.eared._Q.f_ _ lar.ge_ll.a,£ __ C QDg_ _g_~e_i~J1Ia 
fq_!'_'~_~ s. They perform t he following tasks: (l ) serve as <>; channel through 
whi ch contact is reestablished be twe en the n·ati onal government and t he rural 
population; (2) assist the people i n reestablishing t heir normal way of l ife 
and the fabric of local soc i e ty; (3 ) assist them in i mproving their basic 
livlng condi tions ; (4 ) facilitate t he reestablishment and operation of pop-
ul a~'ly ,-; r;; lected village/hamlet governments and (5 ) explain the gove r nment's 
pn,gram to the . rural people .. 
On January l , 1966, t he Vi e t names e Governmen~cc ombined several 
previously· c,xic;ting s pecial types of cadre into one R);) profQ'am· The va r ious 
t ypes of c adr e previ ous l y worked as i ndividual units r espons i ble fo r imple -
ment i ng a vari ety of pr ojects wi thin the overall rural constru ct:i. on program. 
In gt nc r al they suffe r ed from l ack of centralized cont r ol a nd direc t-i onj 
inadeq·Lia-Le t r aining and poorly defined r espons i bili t i es. These var i ous types 
of cadre are now being re- trained and phased into t he ne:v-1 r evolu t i onary 
devel opment cadre gr oups. 
The M\!ll~_ry_of Re_yo~utio~~!X D~velopme_~:f?. .J_§_Qfl~rga.d_ ID.th . . c.ar.rying 
9~-.T~Q.r.ganiz.a.t-¥m, trai ni ng and deployment of the ll~li.JID. cadre , IIT:..If.."W·s. 
Tr aining t he new cadr e i s done at the ~ational Training Cent er a t V~
The training programs include a t l east one group from each province. If 
t he r e is a singl e theme to the training program, it is t o ins till and promote 
a nati onal spirit, awarenes s and dedication in the people of Vie tnam. RD _ 
cadre · are t aught t hey are the link between t he Gove rnment of Vie tnam. and ·,.t he 
rural p~ople . The7 pledge thems elves to the deve lopment of rural Vie tnam. 
The bas~c t raining c~~ teaches t he new cadre about Viet Gong 
ope rations, in f ra:s'truc t ur e . and influence, t he e r adi cation of whi ch becomes 
thei r primar y goal. They are t aught that ther e a r e other nati on ~ assi s ting 
Vietnam, not as a: 'fo rm· of r e-col onization, but as as sis tance t o the people 
against t he enemy and i n support of the social r evolution . Cadr e membe rs 
are given rigorous physical training and a r e taught the use of vari ous a rms 
and small unit tactics . Finally, they are taught t ha t their pri ncipal 
we apon is poli t ical action . 
The second part of Vung Tau training is divided into specialized 
a~ offered f or t he vari ons t ypes of t earw; : (l) militia, ( 2 ) civic action, 
(3) NewJkife DevelQDment . Thes e te ams make up the ~sic structure of ea ch 
59-man RD cadrQ_giQ up. In addition , a l eadershi p course is given to those 
seiected as-~st qualifi ed to serve as the command element. 
/ 
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EaGh of the component teams has a different responsibility, but 
every member is expected to know the other's job and if nee ded, to be able 
to replace anyone in the Group. The teams are expected to operate as a 
coordinated Group. 
Within the group organization, the militia teams have as their 
primary duty, the job of detec ting and eliminating the Viet Gong political/ 
military infrastructure. It is also their duty to organize and train a 
hamlet self-defense force and to assist in meeting needs of the rural pop-
ulation in the fields of social welfare, health and education. 
The Civil Action Teams survey and class ify the area being secured. 
They identify and r egiste r t he village/hamlet people. (In Vie tnam a village 
is made up of a group of hamlets. The RD cadre will operate at both t he 
vill age and hamlet l evel.) Their job is to record not only the physical 
f actor s , b11 t to also identify the op:Lnions and aspirat:Lons of the people, 
both fri end and enemy . Their job is also to make local government honest 
and eff ec t ive . They urge t he participation of the peopl e in organi zing 
hamlet adm:Lnistrative committees, people's councils and people's organi-
zations based on age and interest groups. Their j ob is ultimately to help 
the people hold el ections to se l ect their own l eade r s for local government. 
The mate rial pr ogress of the village/hamlet i s the responsibility 
QL Htb.D.__}Jew LifeTie~eaiilS.- This t as k includes teaching and guid:ii1g 
tho people to a vai l thems elves of government sponsored program..s of social 
and economic devel opment . Thes e teams organize self-hel p projects and bring 
i n di rect assis t ance from the various government agencie s in t he form of 
technical advice and material aid s uch as improved seeds, fertilizers and 
equipment. Through se lf-help projects where government agencies provide 
the material s and the village/hamlet provides the labor, the rural people 
acquire thei r own schools, medical clinics and similar facilities . The teams 
also assist the local people and local officials in implementing the GVN land 
r efor m programs and in stimulating cooperatives and cottage industries. 
Following satisfactory completion of the training course the cadre 
groups undergo two additional weeks of training in their home provinces and 
are then assigned to villages or hamle ts in the same provinces which have 
been selected t o participate in RD in accordance with an annual plan developed 
at the Provincial level and approved by the Central Government authorities. 
Generally these will be villages or hamlets in areas which GVN or other free 
world military forces have recently cleared of Viet Gong mainforce elements 
or areas previously cleared but in which GVN civil authority has not yet 
been firmly established. The cadre groups will remain in the village or 
hamle t f or whatever length of time is necessary to remove all vestiges of 
Viet Gong authority and to firmly reestablish a capable locally elected 
gove rning body which is operating effectively and is in continuing productive 
contact with GVN appointed authorities at the District and Province levels. 
The Province Chiefs support the cadre groups once t4ey are in the field. 
·..,: ' 
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~~~----~-~~~.Ji£~038~~ It is estimated that in some cases it will 
be necessary for the cadre to remain on the scene for a year or more. In 
addition, it takes time to recruit, train and field the cadre groups required 
to support the total RD effort. Thus immediate dramatic results cannot and 
should not be expected from the new approach and set-backs are inevitable. 
However, many of the weaknesses of earlier attempts at using cadre in support 
of the Vie tnamese pacification program have been recognized by Vietnamese 
authorities and have been taken into account in developing the new approach. 
A few months ago the motto "Let's work slowly but firmly" was suggested at 
a Seminar of Province Chiefs held in Saigon to consider the general subject 
of RD. This certainly should be the watchword where cadre are concerned 
since previous expe rience has shown success cannot be achieved in any other 
way. 
Appendix III. Effects of pacification 
on the civilian population 
Certain authorities have expressed concern over the 
advisability of the use of pacification; Jllethods in such 
19. 
a culture as that of Viet Nam. On page 158 of Jean 
Lacoutre's VietNam between two tpuces, the leading French 
authority on Indochina states: 
"In this ancient country to jeopardize the village 
structure by setting up artificial agglomerations is to 
break the backbone of the country its elf, to go against its 
collective conscience; its · beliefs ,_, and its homogeneity at 
the deepest level; this is particularly true if this 
system of intensive organi zation, and close and pe rmanent 
control..- • • destroys the family cell, that other basic fact 
of Vietnamese society." 
I have also included a New York Times News Service 
article on the village of Khanhvan and relevant comments 
by I.F. Stone. 
a~~~- 0~ 
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Pttcifiers Arrive and Pledge . to .Stay,~ 
For 5th Time,in key Vietnam Vii/Qge 
l 
¥-C- c '-'\ - ··~ "\: \ {: j '-.\. ~ . ~-
V'-' ~; · 0.. c:.::\:_, ~-- €:1 V\ C' VV 1 
I. F. Stcnu'• Weeklr~rch 10, 19if:) 
Why the. Constituent Assembly .Is As Undemoeratle A Farce as rrhe Mllituy 
What "Pacification" Really Means to Vietnam's Landless Peasantry 
In Vietnam, as in W-ashington, semantic trickery is the or-
der o£ the day, "Pacification'' means subjugation, and "Revo-
lutionary Development Cadres"-the agents of pacification-
are really counter-revolutionary police teams to subjugate the 
peasant. - "4:het__ 1_ ndlord .. · :wi - -- ' if in ; 
t~~ writes Fred Emery, Saigon correspondent of the 
The· Kind of Regime Washington Ukes . 
~Rio de .Janeiro-This ia tbe eountrJ that 1 ... tlwa 
three 7ean ago threatened to become not merelJ a-
other Cuba but perhape IJOIIlething doee to another Red 
' lands but to extort back rents for the time they fled the Viet-
) 
London Times -(March 10), "not merely to grab bade their 
\
cong." -ptou~h a Ngo Dinh· Diem la:w. of 19:55 lim,its rents 
o 25% Qf the crop, Emery notes that. ·landlords still extort 
. China. • • • To be sure the mllitaey regiae , •• has been 
no model of democratic: permilaiTett... Br .. ruan jour-
nalist. deemed too unfriendly to &he gonruaent .. , 
find the....eiTea behhld ban •••• More imp011aat .tlwl 
dictatorial hQeTolettce are the clear aigu 9f iaproT• 
lng healtll being shown bJ the economJ •••• Price in. 
c:reaae~~ .- eYf'Jthiag. (rom d\ic:ken f.-.1 to nen_papen 
atiU oeeut replarly. The fOT.,..meht prlatblg ~
continae to :Qba out crueiroe • • • bat u.s. a .... .,.. 
lu4bag the ba.netment parade. • • • Un4er a new JD,. . 
n.t-... -......... a......-eat wiU., ... u.s_ .. ..u 
since "19&5- [when the miUtaey took onr-IFS] lau 
appro't'M more than Slit aDHola worth of ..., proj.._ 
bJ U.S. ar.. ... beside the rules Umltblr paJ ..., 
Q'eaaea to peremtages weU below the rate at whkh the 
eo.t o_f li•ing ia riaing, there ia an almost total prohllll-
tion against lltrikes." 
1 
' ' 
ents aS. high as 60% of the p.roduCt of a rice field" and adds 
~'it is not hard to see why peasants keep their arms." 
A Sa~j~t The.~ AI, Ratlatr .Avoi4J:n .... ,,. . lll• i 
Emery says "It may seriously be questioned whether any 
progress of lasting nature can be expected, in spite of mili-
tary successes, so long as pacification continues without a real 
revolution in the Government's attitude towards land .reform." 
He notes that "it is pos~ible to listen to a senior 0C0 [Office 
of Civilian Operations; which handles the civilian end of the 
U.S. effort in South Vietnam] official talk for 90 mi.nutes 
without once menbioning land-just as the subject has not 
found favor in the new Constituent Assembly." Emery fails 
to recognize that the Constituent Assembly is dominated by 
landlords, and that .the American government has no real 
enthusiasm for land reform, especially since it would undercut 
the only class which supports the 'u.S. in the countryside. 
-Wall Street Joumal, Mt~rch 9 
The spectacle of landlords returning with the "pacification" 
. ~/ ll teams to take back the land and collect back rents can hardly . 
,endear us to the peasants. "Senior American officials recog-t nize the problem only too well," Emery writes, "and say, 
/ -- rather nervously, they are hoping the Government will sh,ortly 
come up with a decree abolishing back rents." . The "govern-
ment" .is the mili-tary junta. The Generals are either of, or 
linked to, the landlord class. To expect them to abolish bade 
rents is as foolish as to expect them to decree land reform. 
~~pro_posed that the Cc>Q!~~on 
~tee ~.-!Y Victnamqe ~ the right to own the iiUia'" 
h~ tilled, ~-~~onjy __ i_ O\ltO! 117 votes. "Many 
deputies," Ctitchfield writes," said it souil.dea-.-too'much like 
communism.' He says later Dr. Dan "succeeded in getting a 
much milder proviso adopted pledging government help to 
the landless." · But this (we discovered recently) says only 
(Art. XX) "The State advocates raising the standard of living 
of rural citizens, and especially helping farmers to have farm-
land." Just how is left unclear. .Article XVIII guarantees 
the right of private property and says "expropriation or 
requisition for the common good must be accompanied by 
speedy and just compensation at price levels existing at the 
time of expropriation or requisition.'' This makes it impos· 
sible to pay for land reform in bonds nor to buy land at its 
original (J)St or tu valuation or even to take into account that 
it may -bave · beeo acquired -unlAwfully. Such awtil\ltiooal 
prov~ons ·are an obstacle to peaceful -land reform in Latin 
'_ .. ~ ___ _!_i_chard Critchfield in the Washington Stmday Star (March 
\~ 
~) recalls that a year ago in Honolulu Johnson ·plaiged "social 
revolution, including land reform", [Critchfield writes that 
the last three words were not in the original State Department 
draft for ·the Honolulu declaration but were added on "the 
insistence of the American counter-insurgency expert, Major 
General Edward G. Lansdale, Jr."] 
Land ref<?!:!P was supposed .to be the cornerstone of the n------V 
"r.;,olutionary development program," but when Dr. Ph~T 
~ ·-·-···· 
America.. ---
. In dae Mekong_Q!_lta, Critchfield writes, ~0 ~~~ 
~asant~!- entirely landl~d 8~~-~gt-.L 
~1 _e_~_~_ffieiirtcelands. Thus {or the ma-jority of ·the 
people the ~dlora:a-ooi"ioaled Constituent Assembly ~ as 
unrepresentative a farce as the military junta. 
v 
:,~i~\, In Latin America, Too, Talk of Land Reform Doesn't Mateh the Realities 
"len wh01t~,- - fathers for generations have worked land the land ref~rm agency acquired or expropriatf'CI with eom-
ownect by others now work It as their own." pensation oniJ 21,000 hectare. • • • and established Uttle 
- LBJ's message to Ctmgress on Latin America )!arch 13 more than 2,000 families. • • • In Chile only 1881 famillea 
~eived falaOJ-size parcels. . - • In the Dommlean Repub-
"The implementation of legialatlon atree_ti.ng the aJrarian lie, although ~~everal hundred thouB&nd heetares of fertOe 
~structure is still slow; the di!Jtribu~Q .of .laJtd ' apd other land are in the P,G~MUion of the Agradan m.&l&ute, the 
productive resources among the ,urJtl: populaUdn remains rate of &Jstematie tet.tlement is currently onlJ 1,080 f .... 
very unequal, and potentfaftJ p'rodUfti:vt'-UlDd, ·water and ilies a Jtar, or ._.than 0.5 percent of the numher of tam-
human resources are seriousl7 underutll&ed in the rural iUes workbag Oil aublilltenee traeta of one heetare or leu. 
areas •..• Among the variou11 types of land reform, slow- -Si:l:th Anttut.rl · RepOrl, 1181, 8oci1Sl Pro1ff'61f Trut 
est progress in 19&6 was land redistributiqn •. In Colombia, Fund, lttter-Am8r.ice&n D11"elopment Bank, rele"o.ed llltl.'r. Ji. 
"\.\: · _ ...... 
